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Parties, Movements and the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum:  
Explaining the Post-Referendum Party Membership Surges 
 
 
Abstract 
Some political parties have experienced a resurgence in membership. This article seeks to 
explain membership surges in the Scottish National Party and Scottish Greens following the 
2014 referendum on Scottish independence and an unusually movement-like campaign. Using 
data from a 2016-17 survey of the parties’ memberships, we examine why large numbers joined 
these pro-independence parties following defeat in the referendum. We demonstrate that the 
new members had experienced a sense of belonging to a Yes movement during the campaign 
but were not intensely active; and reasons for joining the parties look more conventional than 
movement-based. We argue that the referendum created a unique platform for the parties to 
advertise their objectives on the constitution and other policy areas and thus attract new 
recruits, few of whom were seeking to maintain the participatory activities that flourished 
during the referendum. The minority that are active movement-oriented joiners look the least 
likely to be satisfied by party membership. 
 
Keywords 
Party membership; movements; referendums; SNP; Scottish Greens 
 
Introduction 
 
The 2014 referendum on Scottish independence saw high levels of public engagement, multi-
actor campaigns and novel forms of activism. At no time during the campaign was there any sign 
that these were impacting greatly on party membership. The Scottish National Party (SNP) and 
Scottish Green Party (SGP), both independence-supporting parties, gained relatively few 
members during the lengthy campaign. However, following the result, a dramatic surge in 
membership occurred amongst pro-independence parties, an increase which did not occur to 
anything like the same extent in pro-union parties. Despite being on the losing side, and quite 
unexpectedly, the SNP and Scottish Greens experienced a spike in membership, the numbers 
increasing more than five-fold over a few short months. This article considers how and why the 
referendum acted as a catalyst for party membership.  
The post-referendum membership surges in Scotland represent an unusual case because 
of their scale and pace, and because they followed a referendum defeat. They are an important 
case for two reasons.  First, they dramatically challenge the trend of long-term decline 
established by studies of party membership in advanced democracies (Scarrow, 2015; van 
Biezen and Poguntke, 2014; van Haute and Gauja, 2015). This study thus contributes alongside 
recent work examining rare examples of other parties bucking that trend (Bale et al., 2020; 
Gomez and Ramiro, 2019; Seyd, 2020). Second, because the surges followed an unusual 
campaign, they raise the question of whether the boundaries between parties and social 
movements are more blurred than is often supposed. While pro-union campaigners focused on 
the ‘air war’, Yes-supporting networks were formed with a greater emphasis on the ‘ground 
war’. The framing and key messages of the Yes campaign were dominated by the SNP, the party 
of Scottish government, but this campaign appeared movement-like in that it was more 
organisationally fluid, creative and grassroots-based, using social media to connect 
campaigners. Della Porta et al. (2017: 30) referred to it as a referendum ‘from below’. 
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We explore how the members experienced the campaign and why they then joined a 
party. One possibility is highlighted by the ‘referendum from below’ idea; that party 
membership involved a desire to continue participation following a campaign with unusually 
high levels of grassroots engagement. Alternatively, the members might have engaged more 
loosely with the campaign but felt part of a movement for change; movement actors need not 
be very active.  Or the high-profile, lengthy campaign might simply have generated awareness of 
and interest in the parties’ policies and ideas. We explore these processes using data from an 
ESRC-funded study of SNP and Scottish Green memberships. We examine the extent to which 
party membership emerged from referendum campaign experiences, and we assess the 
decision to join these parties. Finally, we investigate the longer-term impact of these events, 
examining if the new recruits brought different movement-like expectations into the parties.  
Our findings suggest interactions between parties and movements, an under-researched 
theme in the study of party members. We demonstrate that these members experienced a 
sense of belonging to a Yes movement community during the campaign but were not very 
active, and that joining appeared driven by traditional policy-based motivations rather than a 
desire to maintain participation. The referendum offered a unique, sustained platform on which 
the parties could advertise their values and policy objectives, and thus attract those with similar 
views, including those who had not been active during the referendum. 
We begin with a discussion of referendums, parties and social movements. We provide an 
account of the 2014 campaign and the subsequent party membership surges. Then we describe 
our survey data and methodological approach. Our analysis compares the two parties and their 
new members with existing members, with a focus on how the members experienced the 
referendum campaign and their decision to join a party. Then we examine attitudes to party 
membership. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for the study of 
parties and movements, highlighting that a movement explanation for this membership surge 
has limitations, unless we adopt a loose definition of a movement, based more on shared 
identity than grassroots activism.  
 
Referendums, parties and movements 
 
Referendums are formal mechanisms for making decisions. For some, they are models of direct 
democracy, an institutional expression of popular sovereignty. For others, they suggest elite 
control, with an inbuilt tendency to prove existing opinions rather than encourage meaningful 
debate (Tierney, 2009). Political parties, as formal institutions, play an important role in 
referendums, beyond making the decision to hold one (LeDuc, 2003). Referendums can divide 
clearly along party lines on a highly salient issue, as seen in the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum, with party cues playing a significant role in a campaign, or they can transcend party 
differences and divide parties internally, as in the EU referendum of 2016.  
Referendums encourage alliances and networks to be formed around issue positions. 
Parties, individuals, interest groups and newly created organisations campaign alongside each 
other. These alliances and intersections brought about by referendum have the potential to 
create openings for social movements as ‘arenas of contentious politics’ which ‘fuel citizens’ 
participation’ (della Porta et al., 2017: 37-8). An existing movement may be harnessed, or a new 
movement created. 
Definitions of social movements focus on affecting societal change in non-institutional 
ways. Goodwin and Jasper (2015:1) refer to ‘conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by 
ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means’. 
Thus, movements are associated with grassroots participation taking place ‘outside’ 
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conventional institutions such as political parties. Nevertheless, half a century of research has 
demonstrated that ‘the borderline between insiders (political parties) and outsiders (social 
movements) in politics is not as clear-cut as is often assumed’ (Kreisi 2015: 678). Links between 
parties and the labour, environmental and global justice movements have been well-
documented (Flesher Fominaya and Cox, 2013). The ‘movement party’ is a hybrid model 
recognising how actors shift between extra-institutional arenas and electoral politics (Kitschelt, 
2006). And in recent decades, populist, anti-politics and anti-austerity movements in Europe 
have formed new parties, such as the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, Syriza in Greece and 
Podemos in Spain (March and Keith, 2016).  
Social movements encompass political parties and other groups and actors. Both the SNP 
and Greens emerged from movements, taking the form of social movement organisations 
(SMOs). Accounts of the SNP’s early years describe its place within a national movement 
alongside campaigning groups and representatives of other parties, articulating the case for 
Scottish independence (Brand, 1978). As the SNP became more successful, it became 
synonymous with this movement. The green movement was more diverse, containing more and 
more varied organisations, including the Scottish Greens who were less electorally successful 
than the SNP (Bennie, 2004). Movements, though, overlap in complex ways. The SNP always 
contained environmental and peace campaigners, and since devolution the Scottish Greens 
became stronger advocates of Scottish autonomy. With the referendum in 2014, a new ‘Yes’ 
movement emerged, encapsulating the SNP, Scottish Greens and other pro-independence 
campaigners. 
Our main concern is with mobilisation processes – how and why actors become involved. 
Movement approaches view actors as challengers who mobilise informally through ‘self-
organisation’. Heberle’s (1951: 6) classic definition of a social movement as a ‘commotion, a 
stirring among the people, an unrest, a collective attempt to reach a visualized goal’ captures 
the idea of a movement distinct from a contained organization to which a member ‘signs-up’. 
Membership takes on a different meaning from that of a formal organization but suggests a 
connectedness. Anderson’s (1991: 15) idea of an imagined community, found in his study of 
nationalism, might equally apply: ‘It is imagined because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion’.  
Being part of an imagined community might also be true of a party, but the party 
requires a member to formally subscribe. Parties recruit members who pay a membership fee, 
allowing them to participate within the party organisation. The form and meaning of 
membership is conceptually different.  As described by della Porta (2007: 7); ‘Whereas parties 
or pressure groups have somewhat well-defined organizational boundaries, with participation 
normally verified by a membership card, social movements are instead composed of loose, 
weakly linked networks of individuals who feel part of a collective effort’.  
As for why people join political parties, academic research has investigated this question 
at length, identifying an array of motivations that lie behind the decision. Heidar (2015: 304) 
argues that there is no ‘generally acknowledged typology’ of motivations, but research has been 
strongly influenced by rational choice assumptions, examining the costs and benefits of 
membership and how these incentivise the decision to join. Clark and Wilson (1961) famously 
distinguished between material incentives (tangible rewards), solidary incentives (derived from 
social interaction), and purposive incentives (related to the goals of an organization).  Seyd and 
Whiteley (1992) developed these ideas with the General Incentives Model (GIM), considering 
the perceived costs and benefits of membership but also some psychological and emotional 
motivations such as altruism and social norms (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et al., 1994).   
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Empirical investigations have suggested that few party members are motivated by 
material gain or private benefits (Seyd and Whiteley’s selective outcome incentives). Rather 
more enjoy the social connectedness of participation or are influenced by social norms (solidary 
or selective process incentives), what might be seen as more movement-flavoured motives. 
However, clearly the most common motivation among party joiners is to express support for 
party aims, values and policies (purposive, collective or expressive incentives), often combined 
with a belief in contributing to the democratic process (a form of altruism) (Bale et al., 2020: 
79). The dominance of these incentives – support for party principles and policies – appears 
close to universal in party membership studies (Cross and Young, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2012; 
Poletti et al., 2019; Whiteley et al., 2019).   
Meanwhile, movement scholars focus on ‘micro-dynamics of contention’ and how 
collective identities and loose networks or communities combine to attract participants 
(Klandermans, 2015). Movements contain both grassroots activists and loosely connected 
supporters or sympathisers, and the meaning of participation is not always clear in these 
accounts. Nonetheless, there is consistent emphasis on the collective ideas and feelings of 
belonging which serve to bind participants.  And individuals can experience a sense of belonging 
to several groups and movements. Gamson (2007: 243) argues that people ‘carry around with 
them various collective identities’. Networks involve relationships between individuals, 
organisations (including parties) and events, and they can exist online (Bennett and Segerberg, 
2013). These expose individuals to information and can act as ‘vehicles of mobilization’ 
(Klandermans, 2015: 227-8). 
The relationship between party and movement ‘membership’ has not been studied 
empirically in detail. The Scottish independence referendum and party membership surge that 
followed – described by della Porta et al. (2017: 31) as ‘massive and encompassing mobilisation’ 
– provides a case through which to explore these links.  In the analysis to follow, we 
demonstrate how the referendum created new recruitment opportunities for pro-independence 
parties.  We first turn to the characteristics of the referendum campaign and the details of the 
membership surge.  
 
The 2014 referendum campaign and party membership surges  
The SNP’s centralised professional campaigning had worked well in elections but was deemed 
by its leadership to be inappropriate in the referendum when it needed to reach out beyond 
party supporters. They aimed to establish a separate organisation with a range of non-SNP 
figures working in parallel with the party while still maintaining control. Yes Scotland, created in 
May 2012, became the designated lead group for the pro-independence campaign. Other 
campaigning organisations were able to register as ‘permitted participants’. The Scottish Greens 
had contained a range of opinions on Scotland’s constitutional status but following the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament the party came to officially support independence. At 
the Scottish Green conference in October 2012, co-leader Patrick Harvie encouraged members 
to engage with Yes Scotland.  
The campaign was long and intense.1 With a large network of branches across Scotland, 
the SNP asked members to establish and be involved in local Yes groups. Much of Yes Scotland’s 
funding came directly from the SNP or indirectly through SNP supporters. Most of the 
traditional campaigning – the gathering of data and door-knocking – was done by SNP members. 
But other Yes-supporting groups and networks were created and supported by Yes Scotland, 
                                                 
1
 Effectively running from Yes Scotland’s launch in 2012 to the referendum on 18 September 2014. 
 7 
including the Radical Independence Campaign (RIC), National Collective and Women for 
Independence. These smaller groups were not evenly spread geographically – RIC, for example, 
concentrated their efforts in a few urban areas – but there was a degree of organisational 
fluidity and community-based informality in the campaign, especially in the later stages (Lynch, 
2017).  
The action repertoires on the fringe of the campaign were diverse and creative, and 
social media was prominent, linking activities and events, including online debates, impromptu 
flash-mobs, traditional public meetings and cultural displays (Geoghegan, 2015). These organic 
and innovative parts of the campaign attracted and themselves generated profiles on social 
media. They displayed the characteristics of the social movement, with a diversity of activities 
and spontaneous grassroots organisation. 
The SNP set out an agenda that informed much of the public debate but there was a 
measure of pluralism in the Yes campaign messages. There were differences of opinion, for 
example on the currency of an independent Scotland. The dominant message (on both sides of 
the referendum) was in favour of EU membership, with Yes and No campaigners each arguing 
that EU membership would be threatened if the other side won. At a local level, the policy ideas 
of Yes campaigners ranged from the moderate to the anti-establishment. There was discussion 
of tackling social deprivation and creating a more socially just, equal Scotland – a framing of 
‘redistributive and democratic issues’ (della Porta et al., 2017: 100). More radical voices existed 
in other groups and parties, but the SNP and Greens were part of the egalitarian narrative.  
Key to understanding events is the nature of the long referendum campaign during 
which unprecedented levels of political activism occurred but without any significant increase in 
party membership. At no time during the campaign did it appear that recruitment of new party 
members formed part of the action repertoires of the Yes movement. The referendum brought 
about a newer and broader movement towards independence, but this was not a movement 
that pursued its goal through party membership during the campaign.  
Party membership increased only modestly during the build-up to the referendum on 18 
September 2014. The dramatic surge took place following the result (Figure 1).2 Strikingly, it was 
confined to parties on the losing side of the referendum. Almost as soon as the outcome was 
declared, both the SNP and Scottish Greens announced that new members were joining in 
droves and thereafter the figures began to snowball. A month on from the referendum, 
membership of the SNP had increased from 25,000 to 80,000. The party’s headquarters posted 
membership numbers multiple times per day via Twitter, re-posted by the wider network of 
followers, fuelling a sense of momentum. By March 2015, membership had reached the 
landmark figure of 100,000 which, at approximately 3.0% of the Scottish electorate, made the 
SNP the kind of mass-membership party not seen in the UK for decades. Similarly, in the month 
following the referendum, membership of the Greens quadrupled (rising to more than 6,000). 
By May 2015, the total had passed 9,000, representing an increase of over 600% on August 
2014.  
Subsequently, the numbers began to plateau, reinforcing that the weeks and months 
after the referendum are the idiosyncratic period, but while Scottish Greens began to decline in 
number from mid-2016, SNP membership continued to grow, reaching close to 120,000 by the 
end of 2016.3 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 45% voted for independence; the electoral turnout was 85%. 
3
 By the end of 2018, SGP membership dropped below 7,000 while that of the SNP reached 125,500.  
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Figure 1: SNP and Scottish Green Party membership, 2003-2016 
 
  
 
The pace and scale of the surges was exceptional by UK and international standards (Scarrow, 
2015; van Haute and Gauja, 2015). They were also noteworthy because being on the losing side 
in elections usually dents feelings of political efficacy and willingness to participate (Craig et al., 
2006). This suggests signalling refusal to give up despite defeat. In addition, at the start and for 
much of the campaign, support for independence languished well behind support for the union. 
Defeat came as no surprise but there was a sense that the Yes movement had made 
considerable progress and that the issue remained alive. Politics, as Matalin and Carville (1995) 
noted, is an expectations game and the result was much better than many involved had dared 
to expect at the beginning of the campaign.  
We explore three broad explanations for these events which are unlikely to be mutually 
exclusive. The first is the possibility that the members joined a party because of a desire to 
continue movement or campaign activism. The second is that the members may not have been 
particularly active during the campaign, but they felt part of a loose social movement for change 
and wanted that to continue. The third is that the new members might simply have been 
attracted to the parties because of a high-profile campaign publicising their policies and ideas – 
primarily independence but other policies too. Past research points to the importance of policy-
focused motives in the decision to join these parties. In this case, we would expect the party 
members to support independence and other party policies, but we are interested in whether 
other types of motives, namely participatory and movement-based, are also important in this 
unusual context.  
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The empirical analysis in this article is based on surveys of the two parties’ memberships 
conducted in 2016-17. These formed part of a project ‘Recruited by Referendum’, funded by the 
Economic & Social Research Council (award ref. RG13385-10). The surveys were fielded online 
(via Qualtrics) and distributed and advertised by the parties. They went into the field in 
September 2016; reminders were issued in November and February. The response rates were 
21% for the SNP (16,101 responses from 77,778 members with e-mail addresses) and 22% for 
the Scottish Green Party (1,775 of 8,110 eligible respondents).4  
These response rates are broadly in line with those obtained from other on-line 
membership surveys. Nonetheless they point to likely bias, respondents being more active and 
involved than non-respondents. Indeed, only those engaged enough to read the party's e-mails 
will have found out about the survey. The immediate implication is that estimates of variables 
like referendum participation, time spent on party activities, and satisfaction with membership 
are likely to be overestimates.5 Fortunately, there are reasons to believe that core findings are 
not too disrupted by non-response bias. They are mostly based on comparisons of groups – 
groups which non-response bias is likely to affect in parallel. For example, provided that it was 
the most engaged among both the pre- and post-referendum joiners that responded, a 
comparison of those groups is unlikely to be severely disrupted. Similarly, since the response 
rates were similar for the two parties, cross-party comparisons are valid as the factors driving 
non-response are likely to apply to both.  
The central question for this paper is why the referendum caused a surge in 
membership.  Specifically, we investigate several more detailed questions. (1) Was there a 
distinctive activism profile in the participation of new recruits, either before or during the 
referendum campaign? (2) What were the new members’ motivations for joining a party? (3) 
Did the new recruits have different attitudes and reactions to party membership?  
Our primary strategy is to compare the new recruits with those who were members 
before the referendum. While a dichotomy might normally seem crude, the sharp elbow in 
Figure 1 confirms that a pre-/post-referendum split is the obvious division.6 We assess whether 
new members score higher or lower than existing members on various criteria. Unless new 
members score appreciably higher than established members on a given criterion, we would 
question whether that characteristic was important in driving the post-referendum decision to 
join.   
A second comparison is between the two parties’ members. Both exist within wider 
political movements, but our expectation is that the Greens will more likely resemble the model 
of social movement activism. That party is embedded in movement politics, is organisationally 
decentralised and is visible as an amateur activist party, whereas the SNP developed as an 
electoral professional party (Bennie, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2012). However, we would expect 
SNP members and supporters to have dominated the referendum campaign, given the party’s 
close association with the referendum and its reputation for successful campaign activism 
(Mitchell et al., 2012). A comparison of the parties’ members is one means of assessing whether 
these characterisations are accurate in the context of a lengthy and unusual campaign.   
 
Results 
                                                 
4
 Most analyses are based on the full samples but some questions were put to only a random half of respondents, 
which is why the Ns in some tables and graphs are smaller. 
5 
Moreover, there is no obvious way of correcting for this non-response bias given the shortage of accurate 
information about the parties’ overall membership in order to provide the basis for weighting. We say more about 
this in the first section of the supplementary appendix, under the heading of Samples. 
6
 A more refined breakdown would also place pressure on cell sizes in the case of the survey of Scottish Greens. 
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Political activity and referendum campaigning 
The survey asked about a wide range of activities under the heading of political participation. It 
distinguished between general (i.e. non-referendum) political activity and referendum 
campaigning.   An index was created for general (non-referendum) activity, measuring how 
many out of six activities – ranging from signing a petition to taking part in a demonstration – a 
respondent reported having undertaken. In each case, the extent of reported activity is likely to 
be overstated, partly due to non-response bias and partly because problems of recall tend to 
exaggerate social desirability bias (Persson and Solevid, 2014). But our main interest lies in 
comparing the mean levels of activity across parties and cohorts, a comparison less impacted by 
those biases.  
In the case of referendum campaign activities, we ran a factor analysis that pointed to 
four main clusters of activity: canvassing (delivering leaflets, knocking on doors, and so on); 
visual displays (displaying posters and car stickers or wearing ‘Yes’ badges); discussion of the 
referendum (with family, friends, colleagues, or even strangers); and online participation 
(following ‘Yes’ groups, posting and sharing referendum material and discussing online). Based 
on this, we formed simple summed indices of participation in each of these fields, rescaled each 
so that it runs from 0 (no such activity) to 1 (the maximum that could be reported in the survey).  
Activity means are graphed in Figure 2.7 Two things stand out about the first set of data 
concerning general, non-referendum, political activity. The first is that Green members are 
appreciably more participatory than their SNP counterparts. The second is that the new (post-
referendum) joiners are barely different from existing (pre-referendum) members. This belies 
any notion that the surge came among people who were either new to political participation or 
converted from movement activism to conventional politics.  In fact, when it came to the 
higher-intensity activity of protesting or demonstrating, new recruits were a little less likely to 
have participated thus, but the main story is one of similarity across cohorts.  
 
Figure 2: Mean index scores on five categories of political activity, by party and cohort 
 
 
                                                 
7
 95% confidence intervals are included (in this and subsequent graphs) to give an indication of where differences 
are likely to be statistically significant. We make little reference to significance in the text, however, mainly because 
the huge SNP sample means that even substantively trivial differences are statistically significant. 
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When it comes to referendum participation (as opposed to general political activity) it is the SNP 
members that are more active than the Scottish Greens – perhaps unsurprisingly given the close 
relationship between the SNP and the Yes campaign. Moreover, here there are interesting 
contrasts between existing and surge members. The first two categories – canvassing and visual 
displays – show wide differences by cohort, but the second two – discussion and online 
involvement – show little or no such differences. While active canvassing is obviously much 
higher-intensity than the kind of visual displays exemplified by posters and badges, what they 
have in common is that they are features of an organised campaign – involving resources to 
which existing members had readier access than did those joining post-referendum. Posters in 
windows and badges on coats also signal adherence to the cause, however, and so it is 
noteworthy that such activities were fairly common even among new joiners. On certain items 
that make up the indices in Figure 2, we can draw on Scottish Referendum Study (SRS) data to 
compare three groups (and combining parties): existing members, new members, and ‘Yes’ 
voters as a whole. The respective proportions that reported displaying a poster during the 
referendum campaign were 68%, 54% and 31%. The comparison is only approximate given the 
different methods and levels of non-response bias across the membership and Referendum 
Study surveys. Still, there are signs here that those who would join post-referendum were 
already beginning to resemble existing members on this measure of involvement. 
When it came to discussion, online or offline, of the referendum, those who would go on 
to join were already more or less as active as the parties’ existing members. The proportion who 
reported ‘very often’ discussing the referendum with family and friends was 69% for both pre- 
and post-referendum members – compared to 56% of ‘Yes’ voters according to the SRS. 
However, only a small proportion were involved in the most active forms of campaigning 
including canvassing and attending meetings: 11% of post-referendum joiners reported 
attending meetings ‘very often’, much more like the 9% among ‘Yes’ voters than the 21% among 
existing members. The new recruits seem to have been brought in by more informal links and 
activities, at a distance from the parties or local ‘Yes’ infrastructures. These findings suggest that 
the new members were loosely involved in the campaign – existing members participated more.  
Next, we focus on how the members perceived the 2014 referendum campaign. There is 
near unanimity that the campaign experience was very positive. Large majorities of both parties’ 
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members agreed with Likert statements that the campaign felt like a movement, that it had a 
bottom-up, grassroots element, and that it got them more involved politically (Figure 3). We 
would expect the movement qualities of the campaign to be noticed by existing members, but 
what matters here is the suggestion that new recruits viewed the referendum as like 
participating in a grassroots movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Experience of the Yes campaign, by party and cohort 
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cohort differences. Leaving aside Yes Scotland with its ties to the SNP, new recruits were as 
likely as existing members to connect with the groups in Table 1. Those more movement-style 
groups were thus a feature of quite a few new recruits’ referendum experience, even if it was 
not necessarily an intense involvement. 
 
 
Table 1: Involvement in independence campaign groups, by party and cohort  
 
 
 
Self-reported reasons for joining a party 
How, then, did these experiences translate into party membership? One of the exceptional 
features of the 2014 surge is that so many people joined at the same time, giving the impression 
of a collective experience, and we do see evidence of this. Nearly half of new members said they 
knew other people who joined a party at the same time, compared to one in five of the 
established members. In most cases, a respondent reported that others in their network were 
joining the same party. However, and predictably given the different scales of the surges, a 
sizeable proportion of Green surgers reported that friends or family had joined the SNP.  
Previous research suggests that ideological match is a key reason for joining a party. 
Among SNP members in 2008, for instance, a belief in independence overshadowed all other 
reasons for joining (Mitchell et al., 2012: 73); and we would expect it to be prominent in this 
referendum-driven context too. Our interest is in whether the survey uncovers other 
motivations for joining. The distinction between political and participatory motivations might 
separate those who joined as a means of achieving the policy end of independence from those 
who (also) sought an outlet to maintain the participatory activities that flourished during the 
referendum. 
Figure 4 introduces a list of potential reasons for joining. Respondents were asked to 
rate (on a scale from 0 to 10) the relevance of each reason rather than simply choosing one, 
enabling us to gauge motivations beyond the goal of independence. Each bar represents the 
mean importance attributed to that reason in new members’ decisions to join.8 The longest bars 
are at the top of the graph, confirming that ideological purpose – primarily independence but 
also social justice and environmental motivations – dominates members’ understanding of their 
decision-making. Two other political reasons, being inspired by leaders and disillusioned by 
other parties, were rated next most important. In all, the motivations for joining look quite 
                                                 
8
 For this analysis, we suspend the cohort comparison because we are primarily interested in referendum-related 
reasons that cannot logically have been the reason why existing members – most of whom were in the party before 
the referendum was announced – joined the party.  
 SNP Scottish Greens 
 Pre- 
% 
Post- 
% 
Pre- 
% 
Post- 
% 
Yes Scotland  66 54 49 42 
Common Weal  25 24 42 36 
National Collective  14 12 16 21 
Radical Independence Campaign  12 11 25 20 
Women for Independence  21 20 21 22 
(minimum) N 5,402 7,227 500 878 
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conventional, in that they are consistent with previous studies of these parties. Predominantly, 
members report that they join for policy-focused, ideology-based reasons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean importance ascribed to motivations for joining the parties – new members only 
 
 
Social and participatory motivations fall some way down most members’ lists of reasons for 
joining. This may be partly about social desirability and attribution biases: survey respondents 
are prone to explain their decisions via attitudes and values rather than situational factors 
(Lodge and Taber, 2013). Nonetheless, the comparatively low ratings for ‘mixing with other like-
minded people’ and ‘maintaining referendum relationships’ are notable. This suggests that, for 
0 2 4 6 8 10
Independence
An equal/just society
Alternative green society
Inspired by leaders
Disillusioned by other parties
Maintain exciting movement
Mix with like-minded people
Maintain referendum relationships
So many others joining
Protest against establishment
Mean importance in decision to join (0-10 scale)
SNP Green
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many, such relationships did not exist or were unimportant and didn’t loom large in the decision 
to join.  
However, there were mean ratings comfortably above the midpoint for an alternative 
test of movement motivations, the suggestion that members might have ‘felt part of an exciting 
movement and wanted it to continue’. It is hard to say what was understood by this, but some 
light can be shed by correlating the importance given to that motivation with members’ reports 
of referendum participation in Figure 2. The stronger those correlations, the more likely it is that 
it was referendum activity that drove the sense of movement identity. In fact, those correlations 
are all rather weak, indicating that active participation was not at all a precondition for 
movement belonging. Moreover, the correlations were actually a little stronger with the lower-
intensity participation such as online activity (r=0.17) and visual display of posters and car 
stickers (r=0.20) than with the more active form of canvassing (r=0.11). Plainly, a movement 
identity was generated even among those less directly involved in the campaign. 
A more direct perspective on the movement inclinations of members comes from a 
question worded as follows: “Sometimes people talk about individuals and groups with a shared 
political aim as being part of a movement. Do you think of yourself as belonging to any of the 
following movements?” Eight such movements were listed. As expected, Greens were 
subjectively somewhat more diverse in their movement orientation than SNP members – 
Greens identified with 2.1 movements on average, compared to 1.7 for SNP members. 
Consistent with the evidence shown so far, this average was slightly higher (for both parties) 
among those who were members before the referendum.  
Since parties and movements are tied by shared political identities, we investigate the 
overlap between movement identifications in the Venn diagrams presented in Figure 5.9 In the 
case of the SNP, any difference between the pre- and post-referendum joiners is negligible and 
hard to discern. More important are the similarities: around half of SNP members disclaim any 
movement identification beyond the core business of independence; and, where there is 
evidence of multiple identities, it is driven mainly by the intersection of the peace/anti-nuclear10 
and environmental movements.  
 
Figure 5: Venn diagrams showing overlap of movement identities by party and cohort 
 
a) SNP pre-referendum    b) SNP post-referendum 
 
                                                 
9
 We exclude the two least commonly selected options, the student and LGBTI movements. 
10
 With the UK’s nuclear missiles located in Scottish waters, this has long been a totemic issue for the SNP. 
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c) Green pre-referendum    d) Green post-referendum 
 
   
 
 
There is much more overlap in identities when it comes to the Greens, suggesting the 
environmental movement is less dominant than independence for the SNP. A larger proportion 
of members in the Greens report multiple identities – four, five or even all six. However, those 
who joined in the post-referendum surge tend to identify with a narrower constellation of 
movements, especially the independence and environmentalist movements.  
These results confirm some of the traditional motivations from the General Incentives 
model of joining. In particular, and as in many other studies, political aims, ideological beliefs 
and expressive factors dominate reasons for joining; and the relative unimportance of 
participatory motives is also familiar. However, adopting a different methodological approach – 
asking respondents different questions – has revealed an additional factor in this context, which 
is ‘feeling part of a movement’. To be clear, our respondents were not highly participatory 
movement activists, but they do display both an independence movement identity (sometimes 
alongside other identities) and a sense of contributing to movement politics. This suggests that 
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joining a pro-independence party following the referendum was a way to maintain the 
momentum of the Yes movement. 
 
Attitudes to party membership 
 
The question for this final section is whether the membership surge brought new movement-
style attitudes into the parties. Is there any evidence that the post-referendum members 
differed from established members in the way they wanted to participate? We begin with two 
questions on party membership activities: first, how effective respondents rate each as a means 
to ‘best influence decisions in society’; second, whether they as members would like to be 
involved in that activity. Table 2 reports responses for a sample of those activities. 
SNP members are generally more optimistic than their Green counterparts about the 
influence of party-political action – perhaps not surprisingly, given the party’s greater success 
and influence. However, newer SNP recruits are more sceptical than existing members about 
the effectiveness of canvassing and donating to the party. What differentiates the new recruits 
is not their greater commitment to movement politics – note the small minorities deeming 
demonstrations and marches to be effective – but their weaker commitment to traditional party 
politics.  
There is a parallel pattern in desired involvement. New recruits generally want less 
involvement in conventional party activity but at least as much in the kind of broader 
participation prominent during the referendum campaign: ‘supporting online campaigns’ and 
‘attending rallies’. The importance ascribed to online participation doubtless owes in part to a 
survey conducted via the internet.  Nonetheless, the fact that online participation was not only 
the most popular but also, among new SNP joiners, deemed the most efficacious activity, again 
suggests a loose engagement with movement politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage rating an activity ‘very effective’ at influencing decisions, by party and 
cohort  
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Turning to members’ experiences, one pertinent question is whether party membership was 
able to satisfy joiners’ appetites for, in the words of Figure 4, ‘maintaining an exciting 
movement’. A Likert statement that being a party member ‘feels like being part of a movement’ 
drew agreement from 81% of SNP and 67% of Green members. A first point to note is that these 
proportions are much larger than the proportions who are active within the parties.  Clearly, 
party membership in itself can feel like being part of a movement; activism is not a necessary 
condition.  Second, there was little difference between pre- and post-referendum joiners on this 
question. The apparent effect of the referendum was to leave both old and new members 
feeling part of a movement, without this connoting much about the nature of their participation 
or their reason for joining.  
If those who joined in the surge were seeking to maintain a sense of being part of a 
wider movement, then we would expect those agreeing with the ‘feels part of a movement’ 
statement to be more satisfied with their experience of membership. To test this hypothesis, we 
isolated the post-referendum joiners in each party and ran an ordered logistic regression 
predicting a three-category variable: whether membership had ‘fully’, ‘partly’, or ‘not 
really’/‘not at all’ lived up to respondents’ expectations.11 We included a wide range of variables 
– most of them familiar from previous analyses – that might be expected to predict satisfaction 
with membership, while controlling for core socio-demographic variables like age and 
education.12  
As predicted, feeling that membership was like being part of a movement was in both 
parties strongly positively associated with satisfaction. Even just moving from ‘agree’ to 
‘strongly agree’ on that statement increased the predicted probability of replying that 
membership had ‘fully’ lived up to expectations: from 54% to 69% in the SNP case, and 38% to 
58% among Scottish Greens. These are notable effect sizes given how much else is held 
constant. They also make for a striking contrast with the negative effects of what might be 
called more ‘objective’ movement variables.  More active movement-oriented members are less 
likely to find membership living up to expectations. Having taken part in a protest, having 
engaged in more intense referendum activities, reporting movement-related motivations for 
joining, and believing that movement activities are more effective – all of these had negative 
                                                 
11
 Since less than 2% of respondents in either party chose ‘not at all’, we combine it with ‘not really’. 
12
 To keep Table 3 manageable in size, the results for those controls are not shown but are available in the 
supplementary appendix (Table S2). The remaining variables are all scales recoded to range from 0-1 (or, in the 
case of taking part in protest, a 0-or-1 dummy). 
 SNP Greens 
 Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
% calling activity ‘very effective’      
Delivering leaflets/canvassing for a party 32 24 19 17 
Donating money to a party 32 22 14 14 
Participating in demonstrations or marches 18 16 10 13 
Using social media to argue for a cause 33 32 12 13 
     
% want to be involved in activity       
Helping during election campaigns 52 45 57 53 
Making financial donations to the party 58 46 53 43 
Attending rallies and talks 47 47 50 57 
Supporting online campaigns/petitions 69 72 73 75 
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coefficients (and, while these were not always significant in the Green case given the small 
sample size, they were typically larger in size than in the SNP analysis). 
 This distinction between subjective and objective movement variables is telling. Those 
who felt part of a movement were more satisfied; those who resembled active movement 
participants were less satisfied. This reinforces the impression that the kind of movement goals 
met by membership are not necessarily the kind of participatory motivations usually associated 
with grassroots politics but more a sense of collective belonging. 
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Table 3: Ordered logit regressions predicting membership ‘living up to expectations’, by party 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (A more relaxed significance criterion is used given the small N in the Green 
analysis.) 
 
 SNP Green 
 B (s.e.) B (s.e.) 
Experiences of membership   
Feels like being part of a movement 2.58*** 3.24*** 
 (0.26) (0.65) 
Feels like being part of the establishment -0.01 -0.31 
 (0.17) (0.53) 
   Political participation   
Number of activities -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.18) (0.63) 
Taken part in protest -0.18* -0.54* 
 (0.10) (0.33) 
Volunteered in cause groups 0.02 0.31 
 (0.17) (0.37) 
Volunteered in local groups 0.19 0.32 
 (0.30) (0.72) 
Volunteered for charities 0.01 -1.05* 
 (0.20) (0.57) 
   Referendum activities   
Canvassing -0.90*** -1.26** 
 (0.19) (0.60) 
Visual 0.15 -0.36 
 (0.14) (0.46) 
Discussion 0.16 0.33 
 (0.22) (0.64) 
Online -0.03 0.31 
 (0.14) (0.41) 
Number of Yes campaigning groups 0.30 0.42 
 (0.23) (0.58) 
   Motivations for joining   
Ideological 0.71** 0.02 
 (0.30) (0.63) 
Movement-related -0.72*** -0.97 
 (0.20) (0.62) 
   Number of subjective identities   
Ideological 0.11 0.90* 
 (0.16) (0.52) 
Movement -0.58** 0.85 
 (0.27) (0.62) 
   Effectiveness of activities   
Party-related 2.24*** 2.76*** 
 (0.29) (0.71) 
Movement-related -0.54* -1.18 
 (0.30) (0.79) 
   Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.13 
N 2,390 332 
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Conclusion 
 
The campaign for Scottish independence was dominated by parties, especially the SNP, but it 
contained a variety of groups and actors, and movement-style action repertoires were on 
display. This at the time appeared a transient movement, existing for the duration of the 
referendum, but many then sought to continue ‘membership’ and found joining a political party 
the obvious path. It is tempting to interpret these events as evidence of unprecedented 
collective action or ‘unconventional’ movement politics. Indeed, others have characterised them 
so (see della Porta et al., 2017). 
Our research points to caution in emphasising the movement qualities of the post-
referendum membership surge. That surge, while dramatic in scale, was far from transformative 
in terms of the behaviour, motivations and ambitions of those joining the parties. The reported 
referendum activities of the new recruits were generally not high-intensity – few were actively 
involved in the campaign. Even among existing members, knocking on doors and attending 
meetings were much less common than displaying posters and discussing the referendum with 
others. And the reasons given by new recruits for joining the parties were predominantly 
conventional and policy-centred, not participatory. This suggests the new members were 
attracted to party membership because of an unusually long and high-profile campaign 
publicising the two parties’ policies and ideas – primarily but not only independence. This 
extended platform generated interest in party membership but not necessarily active 
involvement or a new type of member.  There is little suggestion that the new recruits brought 
an alternative movement-style of politics into the parties. 
Nevertheless, existing and new members both perceived the existence of a movement 
during the campaign, a movement of which they felt a part via displaying posters, wearing 
badges or discussing the issues, and this helped generate a sense of momentum. Movement 
connections need not be face-to-face or highly participatory – they can have an intangible 
quality and involve psychological attachments to others. On this reading, membership does not 
equate with activism but means being a part of an ‘imagined community’ and making a 
contribution – even if a modest one – to a movement for change. Our final analysis suggests 
that a sense of collective belonging rather than collective action was key to meeting new 
joiners’ expectations of membership. This movement is as much (if not more) about ‘feeling’ as 
about ‘doing’. Signalling an ongoing commitment and contribution to this movement was a 
meaningful motivation for joining the SNP or the Scottish Greens in the aftermath of the 
referendum.  
Where this leaves the study of movements and parties depends on how we define 
movements and movement politics. On a looser ‘imagined community’ understanding, 
movements and parties are highly compatible. Not only is the notion of a party-within-a-
movement feasible, but a movement identity is likely to boost the sense of common cause and 
unity within a party. However, on a tighter, more demanding definition of movement politics, 
there remains the possibility of antagonism with party politics. There were signs of this within 
our data. Those who most closely resembled movement participants (in terms of prior 
experiences, reasons for joining and ambitions for membership) were less likely to feel that 
membership had lived up to expectations. This is a likely reason why Scottish Greens – whom 
resemble more closely the classic movement participant – were less impressed by their 
membership. It also may partly explain why membership of that party declined somewhat while 
SNP numbers remained buoyant, though the SNP’s greater organisational strength and 
resources have been a significant advantage in retaining members.   
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Both parties remain part of a campaign for Scottish independence and a national 
movement for change focused on achieving a second referendum. The Yes movement implied a 
temporary, time-limited campaign, but the many new party members who joined the parties 
contribute to a continuing campaign for Scottish independence. Many of the members in this 
study were well-networked, especially digitally and they demonstrated clear signs of a 
movement identity, based on a shared constitutional goal.  A caveat is worth sounding about 
the findings of widespread online activity. Given that our data were collected via an internet 
survey, we probably recorded the responses of some of the more active within the digital 
networks. On the other hand, the large majority of members are connected digitally to their 
party, and even the more passive are likely to feel part of the movement.  All of this suggests 
the potential for mobilisation should there be another referendum campaign. 
More broadly, these findings are likely to resonate with those interested in the links 
between political parties and social movements.  For a long time, party membership in 
established democracies appeared to be in irreversible decline, but new movement parties in 
Europe – especially those on the populist left (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017) – have shown that 
they can successfully recruit members. Podemos, for example, experienced a brisk growth in 
recruitment following the party’s formation in 2014 (Gomez and Ramiro, 2019).  Meanwhile, 
some traditional parties, most notably the UK Labour party, saw a striking recovery in 
membership (Bale et al., 2020; Whiteley et al. 2019; Seyd 2020). This, too, could be linked to a 
variant of left populism given its association with the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. There are 
clearly parallels between these events and the recruitment surges that took place in Scotland, 
not least their speed and unpredictability. However, the cases studied here demonstrate that 
anti-establishment or populist sentiment is not a necessary condition for such surges. The SNP, 
after all, has been a party of government for well over a decade.   
In the end, a variety of different factors drive party membership surges. Each example 
tends to involve unique ‘catalytic moments’, such as a desire to take part in a party leadership 
contest (Bale et al. 2020:15); and we should not overlook institutional variables such as the 
reduction or even abolition of membership fees. In this case, a long referendum campaign was 
the catalyst, creating a platform for the pro-independence parties, and referendum defeat acted 
as a trigger. Nevertheless, our evidence suggests a general principle – that parties can benefit 
from support emerging from broader movements, sometimes leading to spontaneous, rapid and 
intense surges of recruitment which are assisted by the ease of joining online. This tells us that 
where political parties align with movements there is potential for spectacular mobilisation and 
growth in membership.   
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Supplementary (online) appendix 
 
1. Samples 
 
The surveys were scripted online and hosted using Qualtrics, and distributed and 
advertised by the parties. They went into the field on 30 September 2016; reminders were issued 
in November and February. More than 80% of both parties’ data were calculated between the 
launch and the first reminder; however, to maximise response, the surveys remained in the field 
until 16 March 2017 – a month after the second reminder.  The total Ns and response rates were 
16,101 and 21% for the SNP and 1,775 and 22% for the Scottish Greens.  The denominators for 
these response rate calculations are the number of members to whom the surveys were e-mailed: 
77,778 for the SNP and 8,110 eligible respondents for the Greens. In each case, and especially 
that of the SNP, this number is some way short of the total membership. The gap is partly due to 
some members not being accessible online but this applied to less than one in ten respondents. In 
the SNP’s case, it is also due to some minor upheaval during a change of database, which meant 
that some members’ details were not accessible at the time of data collection.   
 
Response rates of around 20% open up ample scope for non-response bias. Unfortunately, 
there is no obvious way of correcting for this given the shortage of accurate information about the 
parties’ overall membership in order to provide the basis for weighting.  Even age and sex data 
were not always available or reliable and, in any case, those demographics are unlikely to be a 
major source of bias. A more promising alternative is the timing of members’ joining.  The upper 
rows of Table S1 provide an indication of which cohorts are over- and which are under-
represented in the survey data. Not surprisingly, longer-standing members in each party were 
more likely to respond to the survey. Those who joined during the post-referendum surge were 
less likely to respond – they form a smaller proportion of the survey samples than of the parties’ 
memberships (especially in the case of the SGP).  However, even this does not offer a precise 
basis for weighting. For one thing, the data available from the parties are aggregate membership 
numbers rather than a breakdown of when each member joined. If overall numbers increase by 
25%, this does not mean that precisely one fifth of members are new, because the net 25% 
increase might also conceal leavers as well. Second, neither the membership data nor the survey 
are fine-grained enough to locate respondents precisely within what was a very sudden surge. 
Membership statistics are at best reported monthly (and the SNP’s mid-surge tweets were 
intermittent).  
 
The remaining rows of Table S1 are therefore provided for information. While we have 
no precise basis to compare the sample with the full membership, this does at least profile that 
sample on core socio-demographic variables. 
 
Table S1: Profile of survey sample (including cohort comparison with membership rolls) 
 
 SNP Scottish Green Party 
 
Surv
ey 
% 
Mem
bership 
% 
Surv
ey 
% 
Mem
bership 
% 
When joined     
Before 2014 29 21 23 14 
2014 pre-referendum 14 6 12 8 
2014 post-referendum 47 54 47 66 
Joined after 2014 11 19 18 10 
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 Survey 
% 
Survey 
% 
Gender   
Female 38 49 
Male 62 50 
Other 0 1 
   
Age   
18-24 3 7 
25-34 7 18 
35-44 13 23 
45-54 25 21 
55-64 30 16 
65-74 20 15 
75+   
   
Occupational class   
Professional (AB) 62 73 
Intermediate (C1) 17 13 
Working (C2DE) 21 13 
   
Education   
Up to 16 15 2 
Some post-16 40 21 
Degree 46 77 
   
Ethnicity   
White Euro 96 96 
White non-Euro 1 2 
Black 0 0 
Asian 0 0 
Mixed/other 3 2 
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2. Survey measures 
 
General political participation 
 
Question stem: Have you done any of the following in the past five years? 
 Signed a petition 
 Boycotted certain products  
 Donated money to a charity or campaigning organization  
 Helped organize a charity event  
 Contacted an elected representative e.g. MSP, MP  
 Helped a local voluntary group  
 
 
Referendum activities 
 
Question stems: “Thinking back to 2014 and the Scottish independence referendum 
campaign, did you do any of the following/please indicate how often you took part in each of 
these the following?” 
 
Canvassing 
 Attended a local Yes group meeting 
 Delivered leaflets door to door 
 Took part in door-to-door canvassing 
 
Referendum: Visual 
 Displayed a poster 
 Wore a Yes badge  
 Wore an SNP badge  
 Stuck on a Yes car sticker  
 
Referendum: Discussion 
 Discussed the referendum with family and friends  
 Discussed it with work colleagues  
 Took part in a conversation about it with a stranger  
 
Referendum: Online 
 Followed a Yes-supporting party/group on Twitter or Facebook  
 Posted my own comments about it on social media 
 Shared material about it on social media  
 
 
Motivations for joining 
 
Question stem: “Here is a list of reasons that people have given for joining the party. How 
important or unimportant was each of these in your own decision to join or rejoin?” 
 
Ideological 
 A belief in a more equal and just society  
 A belief in independence for Scotland  
 A belief in an alternative green society  
 
Movement 
 To mix with other like-minded people 
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 I felt part of an exciting movement and wanted it to continue  
 I was keen to maintain relationships made during the referendum campaign  
 
 
Ideological identities 
 
Question stem: “Which, if any, of these is important to how you describe yourself 
politically?” 
 
 Socialist 
 Feminist 
 Liberal 
 Nationalist 
 Environmentalist 
 Ecologist 
 Conservative 
 Radical 
 Social democratic  
 Internationalist 
 Anti-capitalist  
 
 
Movement identities 
 
Question stem: “Sometimes people talk about individuals and groups with a shared 
political aim as being part of a movement.  Do you think of yourself as belonging to any of the 
following movements?” 
 
 Independence movement  
 Student movement  
 Environmental or ecologist movement  
 Anti-nuclear or peace movement  
 Feminist/women’s movement  
 LGBTI movement  
 Labour/trade union movement  
 Anti-globalisation movement  
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3. Regression results 
 
Table S2: Ordered logit regressions predicting membership ‘living up to expectations’, by 
party and including full socio-demographic controls 
 
 SNP Gre
en 
 B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
   Experiences of membership   
Feels like part of a movement 2.58
*** 
3.24
*** 
 (0.26
) 
(0.65
) 
Feels like part of the establishment -
0.01 
-
0.31 
 (0.17
) 
(0.53
) 
   Political participation   
Number of activities -
0.01 
-
0.01 
 (0.18
) 
(0.63
) 
Taken part in protest -
0.18* 
-
0.54* 
 (0.10
) 
(0.33
) 
Volunteered in cause groups 0.02 0.31 
 (0.17
) 
(0.37
) 
Volunteered in local groups 0.19 0.32 
 (0.30
) 
(0.72
) 
Volunteered for charities 0.01 -
1.05* 
 (0.20
) 
(0.57
) 
   Referendum activities   
Canvassing -
0.90*** 
-
1.26** 
 (0.19
) 
(0.60
) 
Visual 0.15 -
0.36 
 (0.14
) 
(0.46
) 
Discussion 0.16 0.33 
 (0.22
) 
(0.64
) 
Online -
0.03 
0.31 
 (0.14
) 
(0.41
) 
Number of Yes campaigning groups 0.30 0.42 
 (0.23
) 
(0.58
) 
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Motivations for joining   
Ideological 0.71
** 
0.02 
 (0.30
) 
(0.63
) 
Movement-related -
0.72*** 
-
0.97 
 (0.20
) 
(0.62
) 
   Number of subjective identities   
Ideological 0.11 0.90
* 
 (0.16
) 
(0.52
) 
Movement -
0.58** 
0.85 
 (0.27
) 
(0.62
) 
   Effectiveness of activities   
Party-related 2.24
*** 
2.76
*** 
 (0.29
) 
(0.71
) 
Movement-related -
0.54* 
-
1.18 
 (0.30
) 
(0.79
) 
   Female -
0.22** 
-
0.02 
 (0.09
) 
(0.24
) 
   Age category (ref. 18-34)   
35-49 0.34
** 
0.23 
 (0.14
) 
(0.28
) 
50-64 0.49
*** 
0.64
* 
 (0.14
) 
(0.34
) 
65+ 0.61
*** 
-
0.22 
 (0.18
) 
(0.47
) 
   Education (up to aged 16)   
Some post-16 0.07 -
0.83 
 (0.14
) 
(1.17
) 
University 0.13 -
0.84 
 (0.16
) 
(1.16
) 
   Objective class (ref. working)   
Intermediate 0.00 -
0.29 
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 (0.14
) 
(0.45
) 
Managerial/professional -
0.09 
-
0.10 
 (0.12
) 
(0.38
) 
   Subjective class (ref. “can’t choose”)   
Working class 0.00 0.14 
 (0.14
) 
(0.36
) 
Middle class -
0.02 
-
0.18 
 (0.14
) 
(0.30
) 
   Cut-point 1 (“partly lived up”) 0.52 0.63 
 (0.45
) 
(1.67
) 
Cut-point 2 (“fully lived up”) 3.22
*** 
3.36
** 
 (0.45
) 
(1.68
) 
   Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.13 
N 2,39
0 
332 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
